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Abstract
Using a dynamic factor model that allows for changes in both the long-
run growth rate of output and the volatility of business cycles, we document a
significant decline in long-run output growth in the United States. Our evidence
supports the view that most of this slowdown occurred prior to the Great
Recession. We show how to use the model to decompose changes in long-run
growth into its underlying drivers. At low frequencies, a decline in the growth
rate of labor productivity appears to be behind the recent slowdown in GDP
growth for both the US and other advanced economies. When applied to real-
time data, the proposed model is capable of detecting shifts in long-run growth
in a timely and reliable manner.
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1 Introduction
“The global recovery has been disappointing (...) Year after year we have
had to explain from mid-year on why the global growth rate has been lower
than predicted as little as two quarters back”. Stanley Fischer, August 2014.
The slow pace of the recovery from the Great Recession of 2007-2009 has prompted
questions about whether the long-run growth rate of GDP in advanced economies is
lower now than it has been on average over the past decades (see e.g. Fernald, 2014,
Gordon, 2014b, Summers, 2014). Indeed, forecasts of US and global real GDP growth
have been persistently too optimistic for the last six years.1 As emphasized by Or-
phanides (2003), real-time misperceptions about the long-run growth of the economy
can play a large role in monetary policy mistakes. Moreover, small changes in assump-
tions about the long-run growth rate of output can have large implications on fiscal
sustainability calculations (Auerbach, 2011). This calls for a framework that takes the
uncertainty about long-run growth seriously and can inform decision-making in real
time. In this paper, we present a dynamic factor model (DFM) which allows for grad-
ual changes in the mean and the variance of real output growth. By incorporating a
broad panel of economic activity indicators, DFMs are capable of precisely estimating
the cyclical comovement in macroeconomic data in a real-time setting. Our model
exploits this to track changes in the long-run growth rate of real GDP in a timely and
reliable manner, separating them from their cyclical counterpart.2
The evidence of a decline in long-run US growth is accumulating, as documented
1For instance, Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) projections since 2009 expected US
growth to accelerate substantially, only to downgrade the forecast back to 2% throughout the course
of the subsequent year. An analysis of forecasts produced by international organizations and private
sector economists reveals the same pattern, see Pain et al. (2014) for a retrospective.
2Throughout this paper, our concept of the long run refers to changes in growth that are permanent
in nature, i.e. do not mean-revert, as in Beveridge and Nelson (1981). In practice this should be
thought of as frequencies lower than the business cycle.
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by the recent growth literature such as Fernald and Jones (2014). Lawrence Summers
and Robert Gordon have articulated a particularly pessimistic view of long-run growth
which contrasts with the optimism prevailing before the Great Recession (see Jorgenson
et al., 2006). To complement this evidence, we start our analysis by presenting the
results of two popular structural break tests proposed by Nyblom (1989) and Bai
and Perron (1998). Both suggest that a possible shift in the mean of US real GDP
growth exists, the latter approach suggesting that a break probably occurred in the
early part of the 2000’s.3 However, sequential testing using real-time data reveals
that the break would not have been detected at conventional significance levels until
as late as mid-2014, highlighting the problems of conventional break tests for real-
time analysis (see also Benati, 2007). To address this issue, we introduce two novel
features into an otherwise standard DFM of real activity data. First, we allow the
mean of real GDP growth, and possibly other series, to drift gradually over time. As
emphasized by Cogley (2005), if the long-run output growth rate is not constant, it
is optimal to give more weight to recent data when estimating its current state. By
taking a Bayesian approach, we can combine our prior beliefs about the rate at which
the past information should be discounted with the information contained in the data.
We also characterize the uncertainty around estimates of long-run growth taking into
account both filtering and parameter uncertainty. Second, we allow for stochastic
volatility (SV) in the innovations to both factors and idiosyncratic components. Given
our interest in studying the entire postwar period, the inclusion of SV is essential to
capture the substantial changes in the volatility of output that have taken place in
this sample, such as the “Great Moderation” first reported by Kim and Nelson (1999a)
and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), as well as the cyclicality of macroeconomic
volatility as documented by Jurado et al. (2014).
3This finding is consistent with the analysis of US real GDP by Luo and Startz (2014), as well as
Fernald (2014), who applies the Bai and Perron (1998) test to US labor productivity.
3
When applied to US data, our model concludes that long-run GDP growth declined
meaningfully during the 2000’s and currently stands at about 2%, more than one
percentage point lower than the postwar average. The results are supportive of a
gradual decline rather than a discrete break. Since in-sample results obtained with
revised data often underestimate the uncertainty faced by policymakers in real time,
we repeat the exercise using real-time vintages of data. The model detects the fall
from the beginning of the 2000’s onwards, and by the summer of 2010 it reaches the
significant conclusion that a decline in long-run growth is behind the slow recovery,
well before the structural break tests become conclusive.
We also investigate the performance of the model in “nowcasting” short-term devel-
opments in GDP. Since the seminal contributions of Evans (2005) and Giannone et al.
(2008) DFMs have become the standard tool for this purpose.4 Interestingly, our anal-
ysis shows that standard DFM forecasts revert very quickly to the unconditional mean
of GDP, so taking into account the variation in long-run GDP growth substantially
improves point and density GDP forecasts even at very short horizons.
Finally, we extend our model in order to disentangle the drivers of secular fluc-
tuations of GDP growth. Edge et al. (2007) emphasize the relevance as well as the
di culty of tracking permanent shifts in productivity growth in real time. In our
framework, long-run output growth can be decomposed into labor productivity and
labor input trends. The results of this decomposition exercise point to a slowdown in
labor productivity as the main driver of recent weakness in GDP growth. Applying the
model to other advanced economies, we provide evidence that the weakening in labor
productivity appears to be a global phenomenon.
Our work is closely related to two strands of literature. The first one encompasses
papers that allow for structural changes within the DFM framework. Del Negro and
4An extensive survey of the nowcasting literature is provided by Banbura et al. (2012), who also
demonstrate, in a real-time context, the good out-of-sample performance of DFM nowcasts.
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Otrok (2008) model time variation in factor loadings and volatilities, while Marcellino
et al. (2014) show that the addition of SV improves the performance of the model for
short-term forecasting of euro area GDP.5 Acknowledging the importance of allowing
for time-variation in the means of the variables, Stock and Watson (2012) pre-filter
their data set in order to remove any low-frequency trends from the resulting growth
rates using a biweight local mean. In his comment to their paper, Sims (2012) suggests
to explicitly model, rather than filter out, these long-run trends, and emphasizes the
importance of evolving volatilities for describing and understanding macroeconomic
data. We see the present paper as extending the DFM literature, and in particular its
application to tracking GDP, in the direction suggested by Chris Sims. The second
strand of related literature takes a similar approach to decomposing long-run GDP
growth into its drivers, in particular Gordon (2010, 2014a) and Reifschneider et al.
(2013). Relative to these studies, we emphasize the importance of using a broader
information set, as well as a Bayesian approach, which allows to use priors to inform the
estimate of long-run growth, and to characterize the uncertainty around the estimate
stemming both from filtering and parameter uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents preliminary
evidence of a slowdown in long-run US GDP growth. Section 3 discusses the implica-
tions of time-varying long-run output growth and volatility for DFMs and presents our
model. Section 4 applies the model to US data and documents the decline in long-run
growth. The implications for tracking GDP in real time as well as the key advantages of
our methodology are discussed. Section 5 decomposes the changes in long-run output
growth into its underlying drivers. Section 6 concludes.
5While the model of Del Negro and Otrok (2008) includes time-varying factor loadings, the means
of the observable variables are still treated as constant.
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2 Preliminary Evidence
The literature on economic growth favors a view of the long-run growth rate as a
process that evolves over time. It is by now widely accepted that a slowdown in produc-
tivity and long-run output growth occurred in the early 1970’s, and that accelerating
productivity in the IT sector led to a boom in the late 1990’s.6 In contrast, in the
context of econometric modeling the possibility that long-run growth is time-varying
is the source of a long-standing controversy. In their seminal contribution, Nelson and
Plosser (1982) model the (log) level of real GDP as a random walk with drift. This im-
plies that after first-di↵erencing, the resulting growth rate fluctuates around a constant
mean, an assumption still embedded in many econometric models. After the slowdown
in productivity became apparent in the 1970’s, many researchers such as Clark (1987)
modeled the drift term as an additional random walk, implying that the level of GDP is
integrated of order two. The latter assumption would also be consistent with the local
linear trend model of Harvey (1985), the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter, and Stock
and Watson (2012)’s practice of removing a local biweight mean from the growth rates
before estimating a DFM. The I(2) assumption is nevertheless controversial since it
implies that the growth rate of output can drift without bound. Consequently, papers
such as Perron and Wada (2009), have modeled the growth rate of GDP as stationary
around a trend with one large break around 1973.
Ever since the Great Recession of 2007-2009 US real GDP has grown well below its
postwar average, once again raising the question whether its mean may have declined.
There are two popular strategies that could be followed from a frequentist perspective
to detect parameter instability or the presence of breaks in the mean growth rate.
The first one is Nyblom’s (1989) L-test as described in Hansen (1992), which tests
6For a retrospective on the productivity slowdown, see Nordhaus (2004). Oliner and Sichel (2000)
provide evidence on the role of the IT sector in the acceleration of the late 1990’s.
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Figure 1: Real-Time Test Statistics of the Nyblom and Bai-Perron Tests
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Note: The gray and blue lines are the values of the test statistics obtained from sequentially re-
applying the Nyblom (1989) and Bai and Perron (1998) tests in real time as new National Accounts
vintages are being published. In both cases, the sample starts in 1947:Q2 and the test is re-applied
for every new data release occurring after the beginning of 2000. The dotted and dashed red lines
represent the 5% and 10% critical values corresponding to the two tests.
the null hypothesis of constant parameters against the alternative that the parameters
follow a martingale. Modeling real GDP growth as an AR(1) over the sample 1947-
2015 this test rejects the stability of the constant term at the 10% significance level.7
The second commonly used approach, which can determine the number and timing of
multiple discrete breaks, is the Bai and Perron (1998) test. This test finds evidence in
favor of a single break in the mean of US real GDP growth at the 10%-level. The most
likely break date is in the second quarter of 2000. In related research, Fernald (2014)
provides evidence for breaks in labor productivity in 1973:Q2, 1995:Q3, and 2003:Q1,
and links the latter two to developments in the IT sector. From a Bayesian perspective,
Luo and Startz (2014) calculate the posterior probability of a single break and find the
most likely break date to be 2006:Q1 for the full postwar sample and 1973:Q1 for a
7The same result holds for an AR(2) specification. In both cases, stability of the autoregressive
coe cients cannot be rejected, whereas stability of the variance is rejected at the 1%-level. Appendix
B provides the full results of both tests applied in this section. The appendix to the paper is available
at: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/drechsel/papers/ADP_appendix.pdf.
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sample excluding the 2000’s.
The above results indicate that substantial evidence for a recent change in the mean
of US GDP growth has built up. However, the strategy of applying conventional tests
and introducing deterministic breaks into econometric models is not satisfactory for
the purposes of real-time decision making. In fact, the detection of change in the mean
of GDP growth can arrive with substantial delay. To demonstrate this, a sequential
application of the Nyblom (1989) and Bai and Perron (1998) tests using real-time data
is presented in Figure 1. The evolution of the test statistics in real-time reveals that a
break would not have been detected at the 10% significance levels until as late as mid-
2012, which is more than ten years later than the actual break date suggested by the
Bai and Perron (1998) procedure. The Nyblom (1989) test, which is designed to detect
gradual change rather than a discrete break, becomes significant roughly at the same
time. This lack of timeliness highlights the importance of an econometric framework
capable of quickly adapting to changes in long-run growth as new information arrives.
3 Econometric Framework
DFMs in the spirit of Geweke (1977), Stock and Watson (2002) and Forni et al.
(2009) capture the idea that a small number of unobserved factors drives the comove-
ment of a possibly large number of macroeconomic time series, each of which may be
contaminated by measurement error or other sources of idiosyncratic variation. Their
theoretical appeal (see e.g. Sargent and Sims, 1977 or Giannone et al., 2006), as well
as their ability to parsimoniously model large data sets, have made them a workhorse
of empirical macroeconomics. Giannone et al. (2008) and Banbura et al. (2012) have
pioneered the use of DFMs to produce current-quarter forecasts (“nowcasts”) of GDP
growth by exploiting more timely monthly indicators and the factor structure of the
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data. Given the widespread use of DFMs to track GDP in real time, this paper aims
to make these models robust to changes in long-run growth. We do so by introduc-
ing two novel features into the DFM framework. First, we allow the long-run growth
rate of real GDP growth, and possibly other series, to vary over time. Second, we
allow for stochastic volatility (SV) in the innovations to both factors and idiosyncratic
components, given our interest in studying the entire postwar period for which drastic
changes in volatility have been documented. With these changes, the DFM proves to
be a powerful tool to detect changes in long-run growth. The information contained in
a broad panel of activity indicators facilitates the timely decomposition of real GDP
growth into persistent long-run movements, cyclical fluctuations and short-lived noise.
3.1 The Model
Let yt be an n⇥1 vector of observable macroeconomic time series, and let ft denote
a k ⇥ 1 vector of latent common factors. It is assumed that n >> k, i.e. the number
of observables is much larger than the number of factors. Formally,
yt = ct +⇤ft + ut, (1)
where ⇤ contains the loadings on the common factors and ut is a vector of idiosyncratic
components.8 Shifts in the long-run mean of yt are captured by time-variation in ct.
In principle one could allow time-varying intercepts in all or a subset of the variables in
the system. Moreover, time variation in a given series could be shared by other series.
8The model can be easily extended to include lags of the factor in the measurement equation.
In the latter case, it is sensible to avoid overfitting by choosing priors that shrink the additional lag
coe cients towards zero (see D’Agostino et al., 2015, and Luciani and Ricci, 2014). We consider this
possibility when we explore robustness of our results to using larger data panels in Section 4.6.
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ct is therefore flexibly specified as
ct =
264B 0
0 c
375
264at
1
375 , (2)
where at is an r⇥ 1 vector of time-varying means, B is an m⇥ r matrix which governs
how the time-variation a↵ects the corresponding observables, and c is an (n m)⇥ 1
vector of constants. In our baseline specification, at will be a scalar capturing time-
variation in long-run real GDP growth, which is shared by real consumption growth,
so that r = 1,m = 2. A detailed discussion of this and additional specifications of ct
will be provided in Section 3.2.
Throughout the paper, we focus on the case of a single dynamic factor by setting
k = 1 (i.e. ft = ft).9 The laws of motion of the latent factor and the idiosyncratic
components are
(1   (L))ft =  "t"t, (3)
(1  ⇢i(L))ui,t =  ⌘i,t⌘i,t, i = 1, . . . , n (4)
where  (L) and ⇢i(L) denote polynomials in the lag operator of order p and q, respec-
tively. The idiosyncratic components are cross-sectionally orthogonal and are assumed
to be uncorrelated with the common factor at all leads and lags, i.e. "t
iid⇠ N(0, 1) and
⌘i,t
iid⇠ N(0, 1).
Finally, the dynamics of the model’s time-varying parameters are specified to follow
9For the purpose of tracking real GDP with a large number of closely related activity indicators,
the use of one factor is appropriate, which is explained in more detail in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Also
note that we order real GDP growth as the first element of yt, and normalize the loading for GDP
to unity. This serves as an identifying restriction in our estimation algorithm. Bai and Wang (2015)
discuss minimal identifying assumptions for DFMs.
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driftless random walks:
aj,t = aj,t 1 + vaj,t , vaj,t
iid⇠ N(0,!2a,j) j = 1, . . . , r (5)
log  "t = log  "t 1 + v",t, v",t
iid⇠ N(0,!2") (6)
log  ⌘i,t = log  ⌘i,t 1 + v⌘i,t , v⌘i,t
iid⇠ N(0,!2⌘,i) i = 1, . . . , n (7)
where aj,t are the r time-varying elements in at, and  "t and  ⌘i,t capture the SV of
the innovations to factor and idiosyncratic components. Our motivation for specifying
the time-varying parameters as random walks is similar to Primiceri (2005). While in
principle it is unrealistic model real GDP growth as a process that could wander in an
unbounded way, as long as the variance of the process is small and the drift is consid-
ered to be operating for a finite period of time, the assumption is innocuous. Moreover,
modeling a trend as a random walk is more robust to misspecification when the ac-
tual process is instead characterized by discrete breaks, whereas models with discrete
breaks might not be robust to the true process being a random walk.10 Finally, the
random walk assumption also has the desirable feature that, unlike stationary models,
confidence bands around forecasts of real GDP growth increase with the forecast hori-
zon, reflecting uncertainty about the possibility of future breaks or drifts in long-run
growth.
Note that a standard DFM is usually specified under two assumptions. First,
the original data have been di↵erenced appropriately so that both the factor and the
idiosyncratic components can be assumed to be stationary. Second, it is assumed that
the innovations in the idiosyncratic and common components are iid. In equations
(1)-(7) we have relaxed these assumptions to allow for two novel features, a stochastic
10We demonstrate this point with the use of Monte Carlo simulations, showing that a random walk
trend in real GDP growth ‘learns’ quickly about a discrete break once it has occurred. On the other
hand, the random walk does not detect a drift when there is not one, despite the presence of a large
cyclical component. Appendix C provides a discussion and the full results of these simulations.
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trend in the mean of selected series, and SV. By shutting down these features, we can
recover the specifications previously proposed in the literature, which are nested in our
framework. We obtain the DFM with SV of Marcellino et al. (2014) if we shut down
time-variation in the intercepts of the observables, i.e. set r = m = 0 and ct = c. If
we further shut down the SV, i.e. set !2a,j = !
2
✏ = !
2
⌘,i = 0, we obtain the specification
of Banbura and Modugno (2014) and Banbura et al. (2012).
3.2 A Baseline Specification for Long-Run Growth
Equations (1) and (2) allow for stochastic trends in the mean of all or a subset
of selected observables in yt. This paper focuses on tracking changes in the long-run
growth rate of real GDP. For this purpose, the simplest specification of ct is to include
a time-varying intercept only in GDP and to set B = 1. However, a number of em-
pirical studies (e.g. Harvey and Stock, 1988, Cochrane, 1994, and Cogley, 2005) argue
that incorporating information about consumption is informative about the permanent
component in GDP as predicted by the permanent income hypothesis. The theory pre-
dicts that consumers, smoothing consumption throughout their lifetime, should react
more strongly to permanent, as opposed to transitory, changes in income. As a con-
sequence, looking at GDP and consumption data together will help separating growth
into long-run and cyclical fluctuations.11 Therefore, our baseline specification imposes
that consumption and output grow at the same rate gt in the long-run.
Formally, ordering real GDP and consumption growth first, and setting m = 2 and
r = 1, this is represented as
at = gt, B = [1 1]
0 (8)
11While a strict interpretation of the permanent income hypothesis is rejected in the data, from an
econometric point of view the statement applies as long as permanent changes are the main driver of
consumption. See Cochrane (1994) for a very similar discussion.
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Note that in this baseline specification we model time-variation only in the intercept
for GDP and consumption while leaving it constant for the other observables. Of course
it may be the case that some of the remaining n m series in yt feature low frequency
variation in their means. The key question is whether leaving this variation in other
series unspecified will a↵ect the estimate of the long-run growth rate of GDP, which
is our main object of interest. We ensure that this is not the case by allowing for
persistence (and, in particular, we do not rule out unit roots) in the idiosyncratic
components. If a series does feature a unit root which is not included in at, its trend
component will be absorbed by the idiosyncratic component. The choice of which
elements to include in at therefore reflects the focus of a particular application.12 Of
course, if two series share the same underlying low-frequency component, and this is
known with certainty, explicitly accounting for the shared low frequency variation will
improve the precision of the estimation, but the risk of incorrectly including the trend
is much larger than the risk of incorrectly excluding it. Therefore, in our baseline
specification we include in at the intercept for GDP and consumption, while leaving
any possible low-frequency variation in other series to be captured by the respective
idiosyncratic components.13
An extension to include additional time-varying intercepts is straightforward
through the flexible construction of ct in equation (2). In fact, in Section 5 we explore
how interest in the low frequency movements of additional series leads to alternative
12In principle, these unmodeled trends could still be recovered from our specification by applying
a Beveridge-Nelson decomposition to its estimated idiosyncratic component. In practice, any low-
frequency variation in the idiosyncratic component is likely to be obscured by a large amount of high
frequency noise in the data and as result the extracted Beveridge-Nelson trend component will be
imprecisely estimated, and as Morley et al. (2003) show, will not be smooth. In our specification, the
elements of at are instead extracted directly, so that we are able to improve the extraction by imposing
additional assumptions (e.g. smoothness) and prior beliefs (e.g. low variability) on its properties.
13We confirm this line of reasoning with a series of Monte Carlo experiments, in which data is gen-
erated from a system that features low frequency movements in more series, which are left unmodeled
in the estimation. Both in the case of series with independent trends and the case of series which
share the trend of interest, the fact that they are left unmodeled has little impact on the estimate of
the latter. Appendix C presents further discussion and the full results of these simulations.
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choices for at and B.14
3.3 Dealing with Mixed Frequencies and Missing Data
Tracking activity in real time requires a model that can e ciently incorporate in-
formation from series measured at di↵erent frequencies. In particular, it must include
both quarterly variables, such as the growth rate of real GDP, as well as more timely
monthly indicators of real activity. Therefore, the model is specified at monthly fre-
quency, and following Mariano and Murasawa (2003), the (observed) quarterly growth
rates of a generic quarterly variable, yqt , can be related to the (unobserved) monthly
growth rate ymt and its lags using a weighted mean. Specifically,
yqt =
1
3
ymt +
2
3
ymt 1 + y
m
t 2 +
2
3
ymt 3 +
1
3
ymt 4, (9)
and only every third observation of yqt is actually observed. Substituting the corre-
sponding line of (1) into (9) yields a representation in which the quarterly variable
depends on the factor and its lags. The presence of mixed frequencies is thus reduced
to a problem of missing data in a monthly model.
Besides mixed frequencies, additional sources of missing data in the panel include:
the “ragged edge” at the end of the sample, which stems from the non-synchronicity
of data releases; missing data at the beginning of the sample, since some data series
have been created or collected more recently than others; and missing observations
due to outliers and data collection errors. Our Bayesian estimation method exploits
the state space representation of the DFM and jointly estimates the latent factors,
14Note that the limiting case explicitly models time-varying intercept in all indicators, so that
m = r = n and B = In, i.e. an identity matrix of dimension n. See Creal et al. (2010) and Fleischman
and Roberts (2011) for similar approaches. This setup would imply that the number of state variables
increases with the number of observables, which severely increases the computational burden of the
estimation, while o↵ering little additional evidence with respect to the focus of this paper.
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the parameters, and the missing data points using the Kalman filter (see Durbin and
Koopman, 2012, for a textbook treatment).
3.4 State Space Representation and Estimation
The model features autocorrelated idiosyncratic components (see equation (4)). In
order to cast it in state-space form, we include the idiosyncratic components of the
quarterly variables in the state vector, and we redefine the system for the monthly
indicators in terms of quasi-di↵erences (see e.g. Kim and Nelson, 1999b, pp. 198-
199, and Bai and Wang, 2015).15 The model is estimated with Bayesian methods
simulating the posterior distribution of parameters and factors using a Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. We closely follow the Gibbs-sampling algorithm for
DFMs proposed by Bai and Wang (2015), but extend it to include mixed frequencies,
the time-varying intercept, and SV. The SVs are sampled using the approximation
of Kim et al. (1998), which is considerably faster than the exact Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm of Jacquier et al. (2002). Our complete sampling algorithm together with
the details of the state space representation can be found in Appendix D.
4 Results for US Data
4.1 Data Selection
Our data set includes four key business cycle variables measured at quarterly fre-
quency (output, consumption, investment and aggregate hours worked), as well as a set
15Since the quarterly variables are observed only every third month, we cannot take the quasi-
di↵erence for their idiosyncratic components, which are instead added as an additional state with
the corresponding transition dynamics. Banbura and Modugno (2014) suggest including all of the
idiosyncratic components as additional elements of the state vector. Our solution has the desirable
feature that the number of state variables will increase with the number of quarterly variables, rather
than the total number of variables, leading to a gain of computational e ciency.
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of 24 monthly indicators which are intended to provide additional information about
cyclical developments in a timely manner.
The included quarterly variables are strongly procyclical and are considered key
indicators of the business cycle (see e.g. Stock and Watson, 1999). Furthermore, theory
predicts that they will be useful in disentangling low frequency movements from cyclical
fluctuations in output growth. Indeed, as discussed in Section 3.2, the permanent
income hypothesis predicts that consumption data will be particularly useful for the
estimation of the long-run growth component, gt.16 On the other hand, investment and
hours worked are very sensitive to cyclical fluctuations, and thus will be particularly
informative for the estimation of the cyclical factor, ft.17
The additional monthly indicators are crucial to our objective of disentangling in
real time the cyclical and long-run components of GDP growth, since the quarterly
variables are only available with substantial delay. In principle, a large number of can-
didate series are available to inform the estimate of ft, and indirectly, of gt. In practice,
however, macroeconomic data series are typically clustered in a small number of broad
categories (such as production, employment, or income) for which disaggregated series
are available along various dimensions (such as economic sectors, demographic char-
acteristics, or expenditure categories). The choice of which available series to include
for estimation can therefore be broken into, first, a choice of which broad categories to
16Due to the presence of faster technological change in the durable goods sector there is a downward
trend in the relative price of durable goods. As a consequence, measured consumption grows faster
than overall GDP. Following a long tradition in the literature (see e.g. Whelan, 2003), we construct
a Fisher index of non-durables and services and use its growth rate as an observable variable in the
panel. It can be verified that the ratio of consumption defined in this manner to real GDP displays
no trend in the data, unlike the trend observed in the ratio of overall consumption to GDP.
17We define investment as a chain-linked aggregate of business fixed investment and consumption of
durable goods, which is consistent with our treatment of consumption. In order to obtain a measure of
hours for the total economy, we follow the methodology of Ohanian and Ra↵o (2012) and benchmark
the quarterly series of hours in the non-farm business sector provided by the BLS to the annual
estimates of hours in the total economy compiled by the Conference Boards Total Economy Database
(TED). The TED series has the advantage of being comparable across countries (Ohanian and Ra↵o,
2012), which will be useful for our international results in Section 5.
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include, and second, to which level and along which dimensions of disaggregation.
With regards to which broad categories of data to include, previous studies agree
that prices, monetary and financial indicators are uninformative for the purpose of
tracking real GDP, and argue for extracting a single common factor that captures real
economic activity.18 As for the possible inclusion of disaggregated series within each
category, Boivin and Ng (2006) argue that the presence of strong correlation in the
idiosyncratic components of disaggregated series of the same category will be a source of
misspecification that can worsen the performance of the model in terms of in-sample fit
and out-of-sample forecasting of key series.19 Alvarez et al. (2012) investigate the trade-
o↵ between DFMs with very few indicators, where the good large-sample properties of
factor models are unlikely to hold, and those with a very large amount of indicators,
where the problems above are likely to arise. They conclude that using a medium-sized
panel with representative indicators of each category yields the best forecasting results.
The above considerations lead us to select 24 monthly indicators that include the
high-level aggregates for all of the available broad categories that capture real activity,
without overweighting any particular of these categories. The complete list of variables
contained in our data set is presented in Table 1. As the table shows, we include
representative series of expenditure and income, the labor market, production and
sales, foreign trade, housing and business and consumer confidence.20 The inclusion of
all the available monthly surveys is particularly important. Apart from being the most
timely series available, these are stationary by construction, and have a high signal-to-
18Giannone et al. (2005) conclude that that prices and monetary indicators do not contribute to
the precision of GDP nowcasts. Banbura et al. (2012), Forni et al. (2003) and Stock and Watson
(2003) find at best mixed results for financial variables.
19This problem is exacerbated by the fact that more detailed disaggregation levels and dimensions
are available for certain categories of data, such as employment, meaning that the disaggregation will
automatically ‘tilt’ the factor estimates towards that category.
20Whenever there are multiple candidates for the higher level aggregate of a particular category,
we include them both. For example, we include employment as measured both by the establishment
and household surveys, and consumer confidence as measured both by the Conference Board and the
University of Michigan surveys.
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noise ratio, providing a clean signal to separate the cyclical component of GDP growth
from its long-run counterpart. In Section 4.6 we explore sensitivity of our results to
the size and the composition of the data panel used.
Our panel spans the period January 1947 to March 2015. The start of our sample
coincides with the year for which quarterly national accounts data are available from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This enables us to study the evolution of long-run
growth over the entire postwar period.21
4.2 Model Settings and Priors
The choice of the data set justifies the single-factor structure of the model. ft can
in this case be interpreted as a coincident indicator of real economic activity (see e.g.
Stock and Watson, 1989, and Mariano and Murasawa, 2003). The number of lags in
the polynomials  (L) and ⇢(L) is set to p = 2 and q = 2 as in Stock and Watson
(1989).
We wish to impose as little prior information as possible, so we use uninformative
priors for the factor loadings and the autoregressive coe cients of factors and idiosyn-
cratic components. The variances of the innovations to the time-varying parameters,
namely !2a, !
2
" and !
2
⌘,i in equations (5)-(7) are however di cult to identify from the
information contained in the likelihood alone. As the literature on Bayesian VARs doc-
uments, attempts to use non-informative priors for these parameters will in many cases
produce posterior estimates which imply a relatively large amount of time-variation.
While this will tend to improve the in-sample fit of the model it is also likely to worsen
21We take full advantage of the Kalman filter’s ability to deal with missing observations at any
point in the sample, and we are able to incorporate series that become available substantially later
than 1947, up to as late as 2007. Note that for consumption expenditures, monthly data became
available in 1959, whereas quarterly data is available from 1947. In order to use all available data,
we apply the polynomial in Equation (9) to the monthly data and treat the series as quarterly, with
available observations for the last month of the quarter for 1947-1958 and for all months since 1959.
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Table 1: Data series used in empirical analysis
Type Start Date Transformation Publ. Lag
Quarterly time series
Real GDP Expenditure & Income Q2:1947 % QoQ Ann. 26
Real Consumption (excl. durables) Expenditure & Income Q2:1947 % QoQ Ann. 26
Real Investment (incl. durable cons.) Expenditure & Income Q2:1947 % QoQ Ann. 26
Total Hours Worked Labor Market Q2:1948 % QoQ Ann. 28
Monthly indicators
Real Personal Income less Trans. Paym. Expenditure & Income Feb 59 % MoM 27
Industrial Production Production & Sales Jan 47 % MoM 15
New Orders of Capital Goods Production & Sales Mar 68 % MoM 25
Real Retail Sales & Food Services Production & Sales Feb 47 % MoM 15
Light Weight Vehicle Sales Production & Sales Feb 67 % MoM 1
Real Exports of Goods Foreign Trade Feb 68 % MoM 35
Real Imports of Goods Foreign Trade Feb 69 % MoM 35
Building Permits Housing Feb 60 % MoM 19
Housing Starts Housing Feb 59 % MoM 26
New Home Sales Housing Feb 63 % MoM 26
Payroll Empl. (Establishment Survey) Labor Market Jan 47 % MoM 5
Civilian Empl. (Household Survey) Labor Market Feb 48 % MoM 5
Unemployed Labor Market Feb 48 % MoM 5
Initial Claims for Unempl. Insurance Labor Market Feb 48 % MoM 4
Monthly indicators (soft)
Markit Manufacturing PMI Business Confidence May 07 - -7
ISM Manufacturing PMI Business Confidence Jan 48 - 1
ISM Non-manufacturing PMI Business Confidence Jul 97 - 3
NFIB: Small Business Optimism Index Business Confidence Oct 75 Di↵ 12 M. 15
U. of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment Consumer Confidence May 60 Di↵ 12 M. -15
Conf. Board: Consumer Confidence Consumer Confidence Feb 68 Di↵ 12 M. -5
Empire State Manufacturing Survey Business (Regional) Jul 01 - -15
Richmond Fed Mfg Survey Business (Regional) Nov 93 - -5
Chicago PMI Business (Regional) Feb 67 - 0
Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Business (Regional) May 68 - 0
Notes: % QoQ Ann. refers to the quarter on quarter annualized growth rate, % MoM refers to
(yt   yt 1)/yt 1 while Di↵ 12 M. refers to yt   yt 12. The last column shows the average publication
lag, i.e. the number of days elapsed from the end of the period that the data point refers to until its
publication by the statistical agency. All series were obtained from the Haver Analytics database.
out-of-sample forecast performance. We therefore use priors to shrink these variances
towards zero, i.e. towards the standard DFM which excludes time-varying long-run
GDP growth and SV. In particular, for !2a we set an inverse gamma prior with one
degree of freedom and scale equal to 0.001.22 For !2✏ and !
2
⌘,i we set an inverse gamma
prior with one degree of freedom and scale equal to 0.0001, closely following Cogley
and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005).23
22To gain an intuition about this prior, note that over a period of ten years, this would imply
that the posterior mean of the long-run growth rate is expected to vary with a standard deviation of
around 0.4 percentage points in annualized terms, which is a fairly conservative prior.
23We provide further explanations and address robustness to the choice of priors in Appendix F.
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We estimate the model with 7000 replications of the Gibbs-sampling algorithm, of
which the first 2000 are discarded as burn-in draws and the remaining ones are kept
for inference.24
4.3 In-Sample Results
Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots the posterior median, together with the 68% and 90%
posterior credible intervals of the long-run growth rate of real GDP. This estimate is
conditional on the entire sample and accounts for both filtering and parameter uncer-
tainty. Several features of our estimate of long-run growth are worth noting. While
the growth rate is stable between 3% and 4% during the first decades of the postwar
period, a slowdown is clearly visible from around the late 1960’s through the 1970’s,
consistent with the “productivity slowdown” (Nordhaus, 2004). The acceleration of
the late 1990’s and early 2000’s associated with the productivity boom in the IT sector
(Oliner and Sichel, 2000) is also visible. Thus, until the middle of the decade of the
2000’s, our estimate conforms well to the generally accepted narrative about fluctua-
tions in potential growth.25 More recently, after peaking at about 3.5% in 2000, the
median estimate of the long-run growth rate has fallen to about 2% in early 2015, a
more substantial decline than the one observed after the productivity slowdown of the
1970’s. Moreover, the slowdown appears to have happened gradually since the start
of the 2000’s, with most of the decline having occurred before the Great Recession.26
24Thanks to the e cient state space representation discussed above, the improvements in the
simulation smoother proposed by Bai and Wang (2015), and other computational improvements we
implemented, the estimation is very fast. Convergence is achieved after only 1500 iterations, which
take less than 20 minutes in MATLAB using an Intel 3.6 GHz computer with 16GB of DDR3 Ram.
25Appendix G provides a comparison of our estimate with the Congressional Budget O ce (CBO)
measure of potential growth, with some additional discussion.
26In principle, it is possible that our choice of modeling long-run GDP growth as a random walk is
hard-wiring into our results the conclusion that the decline happened in a gradual way. In experiments
with simulated data, presented in Appendix C, we show that if changes in long-run growth occur in the
form of discrete breaks rather than evolving gradually, the (one-sided) filtered estimates will exhibit a
discrete jump at the moment of the break. Instead, for US data the filtered estimates of the long-run
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Interestingly, a small rebound is visible at the end of the sample, but long-run growth
stands far below its postwar average.
Panel (b) plots the time series of quarterly real GDP growth, together with the
median posterior estimates of the common cyclical factor, aligned with the mean of
real GDP growth. This plot highlights how the cyclical factor captures the bulk of
business-cycle frequency variation in output growth, while higher frequency, quarter-
to-quarter variation is attributed to the idiosyncratic component of GDP growth. In
the latter part of the sample, GDP growth is visibly below the cyclical factor, reflecting
the decline in long-run growth.
The posterior estimate of the SV of the common factor is presented in Panel (c).
It is clearly visible that volatility declines over the sample. The late 1940’s and 1950’s
were extremely volatile, with a first large drop in volatility in the early 1960’s. The
Great Moderation is also clearly visible, with the average volatility pre-1985 being much
larger than the average of the post-1985 sample. Notwithstanding the large increase
in volatility during the Great Recession, our estimate of the common factor volatility
since then remains consistent with the Great Moderation still being in place. This
confirms the early evidence reported by Gadea-Rivas et al. (2014). It is clear from the
figure that volatility spikes during recessions, a feature that brings our estimates close
to the recent findings of Jurado et al. (2014) and Bloom (2014) relating to business-
cycle uncertainty.27 It appears that the random walk specification is flexible enough
to capture cyclical changes in volatility as well as permanent phenomena such as the
Great Moderation. Appendix A contains analogous charts for the estimated volatilities
of the idiosyncratic components of selected data series. Similar to the volatility of the
growth component also decline in a gradual manner (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A).
27It is interesting to note that while in our model the innovations to the level of the common factor
and its volatility are uncorrelated, the fact that increases in volatility are observed during recessions
indicate the presence of negative correlation between the first and second moments, implying negative
skewness in the distribution of the common factor. We believe a more explicit model of this feature
is an important priority for future research.
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Figure 2: Trend, cycle and volatility: 1947-2015 (% Ann. Growth Rate)
(a) Posterior estimate of long-run growth
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(b) Posterior estimate and in-sample fit of cyclical factor
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(c) Posterior estimate of common factor volatility
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Note: Panel (a) displays the posterior median (solid red), together with the 68% and 90% (dotted and
dashed blue) posterior credible intervals of long-run real GDP growth. Panel (b) plots actual real GDP
growth (thin blue) against the posterior median estimate of the cyclical factor (thick red). Panel (c)
presents the median (red), the 68% and the 90% (dotted and dashed blue) posterior credible intervals of
the volatility of the common factor, i.e the square root of var(ft) =  2",t(1  2)/[(1+ 2)((1  2)2  21)].
Shaded areas represent NBER recessions.
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common factor, many of the idiosyncratic volatilities present sharp increases during
recessions.
The above results provide evidence that a significant decline in long-run US real
GDP growth occurred over the last decade, and are consistent with a relatively gradual
decline since the early 2000’s. Our estimates show that the bulk of the slowdown from
the elevated levels of growth at the turn of the century occurred before the Great
Recession, which is consistent with the narrative of Fernald (2014) on the fading of the
IT productivity boom. This recent decline is the largest movement in long-run growth
observed in the postwar period.
4.4 Real-Time Results
As emphasized by Orphanides (2003), macroeconomic time series are heavily revised
over time and in many cases these revisions contain valuable information that was not
available at initial release. Therefore, it is important to assess, using the data available
at each point in time, when the model detected the slowdown in long-run growth.
For this purpose, we reconstruct our data set using vintages of data available from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ALFRED data base. Our aim is to replicate
as closely as possible the situation of a decision-maker which would have applied our
model in real time. We fix the start of our sample in 1947:Q1 and use an expanding
out-of-sample window which starts on 11 January 2000 and ends on 30 June 2015.
This is the longest possible window for which we are able to include the entire panel in
Table 1 using fully real-time data. We then proceed by re-estimating the model each
day in which new data are released.28
28In a few cases new indicators were developed after January 2000. For example, the Markit
Manufacturing PMI survey is currently one of the most timely and widely followed indicators, but it
started being conducted in 2007. In those cases, we append to the panel, in real time, the vintages of
the new indicators as soon su cient history is available. In the example of the PMI, this is the case
since mid-2012. By implication, the number of indicators in our data panel grows when new indicators
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Figure 3: Long-Run GDP Growth Estimates in Real Time
(a) Evolution of the current assessment of long-run growth
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(b) Selected vintages of long-run growth estimates using real-time data
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Note: The figure presents results from re-estimating the model using the vintage of data available at
each point in time from January 2000 to March 2015. The start of the estimation sample is fixed at
Q1:1947. Panel (a) plots the median real-time estimate of current long-run growth over time. This
is the locus traced by the end points of all vintages. The blue shaded areas represent the 68th and
90th percentiles. The dashed line is the contemporaneous estimate of the historical average of real
GDP growth. The diamonds are the median response to the Philadelphia Fed Livingston Survey
of Professional Forecasters on the average growth rate for the next 10 years. Panel (b) displays
the median estimate of long-run GDP growth for various vintages of data (dashed gray lines). The
estimate of the latest vintage is shown in solid red. Gray shaded areas represent NBER recessions.
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Figure 3 looks at the model’s real-time assessment of the posterior distribution of
long-run growth at various points in time. Panel (a) plots the real-time estimate of
current long-run growth, with 68% and 90% uncertainty bands. For comparison, the
panel also displays the median response to the Philadelphia Feds Livingston Survey
of Professional Forecasters (SPF) on the average growth rate for the next 10 years,
and the estimate of long-run growth from a model with a constant intercept for GDP
growth. The latter estimate is also updated as new information arrives, but weighs all
points of the sample equally. Panel (b) displays several vintages of the median long-run
growth estimate, using information available up to July of each year. The locus traced
by the end point of each vintage corresponds to the current real-time estimate of Panel
(a).
The evolution of the baseline model’s estimate of long-run growth when estimated
in real time declines gradually from a peak of about 4% in early 2000 to around 2.5%
just after the end of the Great Recession. From this time, the constant estimate shown
in panel (a) is always outside of the 90% posterior bands. There is a sharp reassessment
of long-run growth around July 2010, coinciding with the publication by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis of the annual revisions to the National Accounts, which each
year incorporate previously unavailable information for the previous three years. The
revisions implied a substantial downgrade, in particular, to the growth of consumption
in the first year of the recovery, from 2.5% to 1.6%, and instead allocated much of
the growth in GDP during the recovery to inventory accumulation.29 Reflecting the
role of consumption as the most persistent and forward looking component of GDP,
the estimate of long-run growth is downgraded sharply. Panel (b) shows how the
2010 revisions in fact trigger a re-interpretation of the years leading to the Great
appear. Full details about the construction of the vintage database are available in Appendix E.
29See Appendix I for additional figures on the National Accounts revisions during this period.
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Recession. With the revised information, the bulk of the slowdown in long-run growth
is now estimated to have occurred before the recession.30 From 2010 onward, the model
predicts a recovery that is extremely slow by historical standards. This is four years
before the structural break test detected a statistically significant decline.31 In the
latest part of the sample, the estimate of long-run growth has recovered slightly to
about 2%. Interestingly, this has been triggered by improvements in incoming data,
rather than revisions to past vintages.
With regards to the SPF, it is noticeable that from 2003 to about 2010, the survey
is remarkably similar to the model, but since then, the SPF forecast has continued to
drift down only very slowly, standing at 2.5% as of mid-2015. It is noteworthy that, as
pointed out by Stanley Fischer in the speech quoted in the introduction, during that
period both private and institutional forecasters systematically overestimated growth.
4.5 Implications for Nowcasting GDP
The standard DFM with constant long-run growth and constant volatility has been
successfully applied to produce current quarter nowcasts of GDP (see Banbura et al.,
2010, for a survey). Using our real-time US database, we carefully evaluate whether
the introduction of time-varying long-run growth and SV into the DFM framework
also improves the performance of the model along this dimension. We find that over
the evaluation window 2000-2015 the model is at least as accurate at point forecasting,
and significantly better at density forecasting than the benchmark DFM. We find that
most of the improvement in density forecasting comes from correctly assessing the
center and the right tail of the distribution, implying that the time-invariant DFM
30Indeed, the (one-sided) filtered estimate based on the latest vintage, which ignores the e↵ect of
data revisions, displays a more gradual pattern of decline (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A).
31A simpler specification that does not use consumption to inform the trend would detect the
decline in long-run growth one year later, with additional revisions to past GDP in July 2011.
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is assigning excessive probability to a strong recovery. In an evaluation sub-sample
spanning the post-recession period, the relative performance of both point and density
forecasts improves substantially, coinciding with the significant downward revision of
the model’s assessment of long-run growth. In fact, ignoring the variation in long-run
GDP growth would have resulted in being on average around 1 percentage point too
optimistic from 2009 to 2015.32
To sum up, the addition of the time-varying components not only provides a tool
for decision-makers to update their knowledge about the state of long-run growth in
real time. It also brings about a substantial improvement in short-run forecasting
performance when the trend is shifting, without worsening the forecasts when the
latter is relatively stable. The proposed model therefore provides a robust and timely
methodology to track GDP when long-run growth is uncertain.
4.6 Inspecting the Role of Data Set Size and Composition
In this paper we argue that the rich multivariate framework of a DFM will facilitate
the extraction of the long-run growth component of GDP. The DFM will exploit the
cross-sectional dimension, and not just the time series dimension in separating cycle
from trend. It is interesting to quantify the advantage that the DFM provides over
traditional trend-cycle decompositions, and to investigate the robustness of our main
conclusions to alternative datasets of varying size and composition. In order to do so,
we consider (1) a bivariate model with GDP and unemployment only (labeled “Okun”),
(2) an intermediate model with GDP and the four additional variables often included
in the construction of coincident indicators, see Mariano and Murasawa (2003) and
Stock and Watson (1989) (labeled “MM03”), (3) our “Baseline” specification with 28
variables, and (4) an “Extended” model that uses disaggregated data for many of the
32Appendix H provides the full details of the forecast evaluation exercise.
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headline series included in the baseline specification, totaling 155 variables.33 Moreover,
in order to investigate the gains associated with imposing additional structure to long-
run GDP growth, for the last two specifications we also consider a version of the model
that does not impose common long-run growth in GDP and consumption.
The top panel of Table 2 reports the mean point-estimates for each of the specifica-
tions over selected subsamples of the data.34 In all cases, the results are consistent with
a decline in the long-run growth rate in the last part of the sample. Quantitatively,
most specifications are very close to the baseline, with the specifications that impose
common long-run growth in GDP and consumption finding an earlier and sharper de-
cline. The exception is the “Okun” specification which instead estimates a smaller
increase in the mid 1990s as well as a larger decline in long-run growth in the past
decade. It is noteworthy that the mean estimate of the extended specification is very
close to that of the baseline.
The lower panel of Table 2 instead investigates the uncertainty around the mean
estimates. The uncertainty around the long-run growth estimate declines as we move
from the bivariate to the multivariate specifications, with most of the reduction hap-
pening once a handful of variables are included. On the other hand, when the panel is
extended to include a large number of disaggregated series, the uncertainty increases.35
33As we argue in Section 4.1, the introduction of a large number of disaggregated series, even if
related to real activity, is likely to lead to model misspecification whenever the sectoral data are not
contemporaneously related. For the extended specification, we consider a solution to this problem
which allows to maintain the parsimonious one factor structure. By extending the model to include
lags of the factor in the transition equation, each variable can display heterogeneous responses to
the common factor, and correlation between idiosyncratic components is reduced. Given that the
extended model is heavily parameterized, we follow D’Agostino et al. (2015) in choosing priors that
shrink the model towards the contemporaneous-only specification, which is nested in the extended
case. Full details and the composition of the data set and the changes to the estimation in case of the
extended model are provided in Appendix J.
34See Figure J.1 in Appendix J for a comparison of the results of each alternative specification with
the baseline results over the entire sample.
35The variance of the common factor declines further in the extended specification. However, as
more disaggregated variables are added which the common factor must explain, more variability of
GDP is left to be explained by the long-run component. As a result, the long-run component tends
to overfit higher frequency movements in GDP and consumption.
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While including a few key series, such as the ones in the specification of Mariano and
Murasawa (2003) seems to already achieve the bulk of the reduction in uncertainty, it
should be taken into account that those variables are available only with a relatively
long publication lag, and subject to considerable revisions over time. Our proposed
strategy of using an intermediate number of indicators, including the more timely and
accurate surveys, is likely to lead to more satisfactory results in a real-time setting.
Furthermore, the inclusion of the surveys is helpful in identifying the long-run growth
rate, as those variables do not display a time-varying long-run mean by construction.
Overall this exercise highlights that the finding of a substantial decline in the long-
run growth rate is confirmed across di↵erent specifications that use data sets of varying
size and composition. The baseline specification, which uses an intermediate number of
series including both hard data and surveys, leads to the lowest uncertainty around the
long-run growth estimate, supporting the baseline choice of data set size and composi-
tion proposed in Section 4.1. Our results have important implications for trend-cycle
decompositions of output, which usually include only a few cyclical indicators, gen-
erally inflation or variables that are direct inputs to the production function (see e.g.
Gordon, 2014a or Reifschneider et al., 2013). As we show, greater precision of the trend
component can be achieved by exploiting the common cyclical features of additional
macroeconomic variables.36
36Basistha and Startz (2008) make a similar point, arguing that the inclusion of indicators that are
informative about common cycles can help reduce the uncertainty around Kalman filter estimates of
the long-run rate of unemployment (NAIRU).
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Table 2: Comparison of results for alternative data sets and specifications
Baseline Extended
Okun MM03 GDP only GDP + C GDP only GDP + C
Long-run growth
1947-1972 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.9 3.7 3.9
1973-1995 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2
1996-2007 2.6 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.1
2008-2015 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.8 2.1 1.7
End of Sample 1.2 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.1
Uncertainty: Long run
Filtered 0.84 0.62 0.63 0.53 0.70 0.62
Smoothed 0.44 0.36 0.35 0.32 0.41 0.39
Uncertainty: Cycle
Filtered 2.15 1.48 0.79 0.78 0.23 0.18
Smoothed 1.98 1.32 0.62 0.61 0.25 0.17
Notes: Each column presents the estimation results corresponding to the alternative models (data
sets) considered in this section. The upper panel displays the posterior means of the long-run growth
rate of real GDP, over selected subsamples. In the lower panel, the posterior uncertainty corresponding
to both the long-run growth rate of real GDP, as well as the cyclical factor are displayed.
5 Decomposing Movements in Long-Run Growth
In this section, we show how our model can be used to decompose the long-run
growth rate of output into long-run movements in labor productivity and labor input.
By doing this, we exploit the ability of the model to filter away cyclical variation and
idiosyncratic noise and obtain clean estimates of underlying long-run trends. We see
this exercise as a step towards giving an economically more meaningful interpretation
to the movements in long-run real GDP growth detected by our model.
GDP growth is by identity the sum of growth in output per hour and growth in
total hours worked. It is therefore possible to split the long-run growth trend in our
model into two orthogonal components such that this identity is satisfied in the long
run. Here we make use of our flexible definition of ct in equation (2). In particular,
ordering the growth rates of real GDP, real consumption and total hours as the first
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three variables in yt, we define
at =

zt
ht
 
, B =
241 11 1
0 1
35 , (10)
so that the model is specified with two time-varying components, the first of which loads
output and consumption but not hours, and the second loads all three series. The first
component is then by construction the long-run growth rate of labor productivity, while
the second one captures low-frequency movements in labor input independent of pro-
ductivity.37 Given the relation in (10), the two components add up to the time-varying
intercept in the baseline specification, i.e. gt = zt + ht.38 It follows from standard
growth theory that our estimate of the long-run growth rate of labor productivity will
capture both technological factors and other factors, such as capital deepening and
labor quality.39
Figure 4 presents the results of the decomposition exercise for the US. Panel (a)
plots the median posterior estimate of long-run real GDP growth and its labor pro-
ductivity and total hours components. The posterior bands for long-run real GDP
growth are included. The time series evolution conforms very closely to the narrative
of Fernald (2014), with a pronounced boom in labor productivity in the mid-1990’s and
a subsequent fall in the 2000’s clearly visible. The decline in the 2000’s is relatively
37zt and ht jointly follow random walks with diagonal covariance matrix as defined by equation (7).
While the orthogonality assumption is not required for identification, imposing it allows us to interpret
the innovations to the trends as exogenous shocks to the long-run growth rates of the variables. The
hours trend is therefore interpreted as those low-frequency movements in hours which are uncorrelated
with labor productivity. Allowing for a full covariance matrix leaves the results broadly unchanged.
38Since zt and ht are independent and add up to gt, we set the prior on the scale of their variances
to half of the one set in Section 4.2 on gt. In addition, note that the cyclical movement in labor
productivity is given by (1   3)ft.
39Further decomposing zt into technology and non-technology movements requires additional in-
formation to separately identify these components. One possibility, which we explore in Appendix K,
is to use an independent measure of TFP to isolate technological factors. Note, however, that reliable
data on capital input, labor quality, or estimates of TFP are not available in real time, making the
focus on long-run labor productivity more appealing in a real-time setting.
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Figure 4: Decomposition of Long-run US Output Growth
(a) Posterior median estimates of decomposition
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(b) Filtered estimates of long-run growth components
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Note: Panel (a) plots the posterior median (solid red), together with the 68% and 90% (doted and
dashed blue) posterior credible intervals of long-run GDP growth and the posterior median of both
long-run labor productivity growth and long-run total hours growth (solid green and dashed orange).
Panel (b) plots the filtered estimates of these two components, i.e. zˆt|t and hˆt|t, since 1990. For
comparison, the corresponding forecasts from the SPF are plotted. The SPF forecast for total hours
is obtained as the di↵erence between the forecasts for real GDP and labor productivity.
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sudden while the 1970’s slowdown appears as a more gradual phenomenon starting
in the late 1960’s. Furthermore, the results reveal that during the 1970’s and 1980’s
the impact of the productivity slowdown on output growth was partly masked by a
secular increase in hours, probably reflecting increases in the working-age population
as well as labor force participation (see e.g. Goldin, 2006). Focusing on the period
since 2000, labor productivity accounts for almost the entire decline.40 This contrasts
explanations by which slow labor force growth has been a drag on GDP growth. When
taking away the cyclical component of hours and focusing solely on its long-run compo-
nent, the contribution of hours has, if anything, accelerated since the Great Recession.
Panel (b) presents the filtered estimates of the two components, i.e. the output of the
Kalman Filter which uses data only up to each point in time. For comparison, the
corresponding SPF forecasts are included. Most notably, this plot reveals that starting
around 2005 a relatively sharp revision to labor productivity drives the decline in long-
run output growth.41 Interestingly, the professional forecasters have been very slow
in incorporating the productivity slowdown into their long-run forecasts. This delay
explains their persistent overestimation of GDP growth since the recession.
It is interesting to compare the results of our decomposition exercise to similar ap-
proaches in the recent literature, in particular Gordon (2010, 2014a) and Reifschneider
et al. (2013). Like us, they specify a state space model with a common cyclical compo-
nent and use the ‘output identity’ to decompose the long-run growth rate of GDP into
underlying drivers. A key di↵erence resides in the Bayesian estimation of the model,
which enables us to impose a conservative prior on the variance of the long-run growth
40In Appendix K, where we extend this analysis to further decompose the labor productivity trend
into long-run TFP and non-technological forces, we find that movements in TFP account for virtually
all of the slowdown.
41In an additional figure, provided in Appendix A, we plot 5,000 draws from the joint posterior
distribution of the variances of the innovations to the labor productivity and hours components. This
analysis confirms the conclusion from the discussion here that changes in labor productivity, rather
than in labor input, are the key driver of low frequency movements in real GDP growth.
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component that helps avoiding over-fitting the data. Furthermore, the inclusion of SV
in the cyclical component helps to prevent unusually large cyclical movements from
contaminating the long-run estimate. Another important di↵erence is that we use a
larger amount of information, including key cyclical indicators like industrial produc-
tion, sales, and business surveys, which are generally not included in a production
function approach. This allows us to retrieve a timely and precise estimate of the
cyclical component and, as a consequence, to reduce the uncertainty that is inherent
to any trend-cycle decomposition of the data, as discussed in Section 4.6. As a result,
we obtain a substantially less pessimistic estimate of the long-run growth of GDP than
these studies in the latest part of the sample. For instance, Gordon (2014a) reports
a long-run GDP growth estimate below 1% for the end of the sample, whereas our
median estimate stands at around 2%.42
5.1 International Evidence
To gain an international perspective on our results, we estimate the DFM for the
other G7 economies and perform the decomposition exercise for each of them.43 The
median posterior estimates of the labor productivity and labor input trends are dis-
played in Figure 5. Labor productivity, displayed in Panel (a), plays again the key role
in determining movements in long-run growth. In the Western European economies
and Japan, the elevated growth rates of labor productivity prior to the 1970’s reflect the
42The results for a bivariate model of GDP and unemployment, which we have discussed in Section
4.6 show that the current long-run growth estimate is 1.2%, close to Gordon (2014a).
43Details on the specific data series used for each country are available in Appendix E. For hours,
we again follow the methodology of Ohanian and Ra↵o (2012). In the particular case of the UK,
the quarterly series for hours displays a drastic change in its stochastic properties in the early 1990’s
owing to a methodological change in the construction by the ONS, as confirmed by the ONS LFS
manual. We address this issue by using directly the annual series from the TED, which requires an
appropriate extension of equation (9) to annual variables (see Banbura et al. 2012). To avoid weak
identification of ht for the UK, we truncate our prior on its variance to discard values which are larger
than twice the maximum posterior draw of the case of the other countries.
34
rebuilding of the capital stock from the destruction from World War II, and ended as
these economies converged towards US levels of output per capita. The labor produc-
tivity profile of Canada broadly follows that of the US, with a slowdown in the 1970’s
and a temporary mild boom during the late 1990’s. Interestingly, this acceleration in
the 1990’s did not occur in Western Europe and Japan.44 The UK displays a decline
in labor productivity similar to the US. This “productivity puzzle” has been debated
extensively in the UK (see e.g. Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2014). It is interesting to note
that the two countries which experienced a more severe financial crisis, the US and the
UK, appear to be the ones with greatest declines in productivity since the early 2000’s,
similar to the evidence documented in Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2009).
Panel (b) displays the movements in long-run hours worked identified by equation
(10). The contribution of this component to overall long-run output growth varies
considerably across countries. However, within each country it is more stable over time
than the productivity component, which is in line with our findings for the US. Indeed,
the extracted long-run trend in total hours includes various potentially o↵setting forces
that can lead to changes in long-run output growth. In any case, the results of our
decomposition exercise indicate that after using the DFM to remove business-cycle
variation in hours and output, the decline in long-run GDP growth that has been
observed in the advanced economies since the early 2000’s is entirely accounted for by
a decline in the labor productivity trend. Finally, it is interesting to note that for the
countries in the sample long-run productivity growth appears to converge in the cross
section, while there is no evidence of convergence in the long-run growth of hours.45
44On the lost decade in Japan, see Hayashi and Prescott (2002). Gordon (2004) examines the
absence of the IT boom in Europe.
45Similar evidence for emerging economies has been recently presented by Pritchett and Summers
(2014). Their evidence refers to convergence of overall GDP growth rates, whereas ours indicates that
convergence in productivity growth appears to be the dominant source of convergence.
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Figure 5: Decomposition for Other Advanced Economies
(a) Long-run Labor Productivity
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Note: Panel (a) displays the posterior median of long-run labor productivity across advanced
economies. Panel (b) plots the corresponding estimates of long-run total hours worked. In both
panels, ’Euro Area’ represents a weighted average of Germany, Italy and France.
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6 Concluding Remarks
The sluggish recovery from the Great Recession has raised the question whether
the long-run growth rate of US real GDP is now lower than it has been on average over
the postwar period. We have presented a dynamic factor model that allows for both
changes in long-run GDP growth and stochastic volatility. Estimating the model with
Bayesian methods, we provide evidence that long-run growth of US GDP displays a
gradual decline after the turn of the century, moving from its peak of 3.5% to about 2%
in 2015. Using real-time vintages of data we demonstrate the model’s ability to track
GDP in a timely and reliable manner. By the summer of 2010 the model would have
concluded that a significant decline in long-run growth was behind the slow recovery,
therefore substantially improving the real-time tracking of GDP by explicitly taking
into account the uncertainty surrounding long-run growth. Finally, we discuss the
drivers of movements in long-run output growth through the lens of our model by
decomposing it into the long-run growth rates of labor productivity and labor input.
Using data for both the US and other advanced economies our model points to a
global slowdown in labor productivity as the main driver of weak growth in recent
years, extending the narrative of Fernald (2014) to other economies. Studying the deep
causes of the secular decline in growth is an important priority for future research.
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